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Abstract
This paper investigates the factors that shaped the demographic transition in a
number of European countries (Sweden, England, and France) since the mid 18th
century. The analytical framework is a version of the neoclassical growth model
with dynastic preferences calibrated to match the Swedish experience. This setup is
studied quantitatively to asses the contribution of various factors to the explanation
of the observed demographic patterns, both over time and across countries. The
factors considered are mortality changes, technological progress, and the evolution of
thecost ofchildren. Theanalysissuggeststhat thecontribution of observedmortality
rates and technology is only partial. A substantial part ofthedemographic-transition
facts must be attributed to unobservable variation in the cost of children, both over
time and across countries.
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11 Introduction
The mid 18th century witnessed the onset of unprecedented demographic changes in West
European populations. Di¤erences in timing and speed across countries notwithstanding,
these transformations in reproductive behavior involved the eventual shift from the his-
torical high to the current low levels of mortality and fertility. The declines in mortality
generally antedated the fertility declines.1 As result of this lag between mortality and fer-
tility reductions, the natural rate of growth of European populations accelerated markedly
between 1750 and 1850, with peak growth rates recorded over the second half of the 19th
century. Subsequently, lastingdeclining trends inreproductionrates gathered pace, thereby
leading to the modest natural rates of increase observed in recent times.
Behindthis general pictureliesa diversity ofnational experiences. Chesnais (1992,p223),
Anderson (1996,p217-224), and Woods (1996,p305-307) concur in identifying di¤erentiated
models according to the timing and amplitude of the changes undergone up to the late
19th century. The Northern model is characterized by mortality declines driving the early
surge of natural rates of increase in the presence of stable or mildly declining fertility. It
is regarded as the pattern that best conforms to the description o¤ered by the traditional
model of the demographic transition. Sweden, in particular, is the classical textbook ex-
ample of this theory. England (and Wales) represent a model where the early mortality
declines were accompanied by appreciable increases in fertility. Therefore, the burst of
population growth there exhibited a larger amplitude and longer duration, relative to the
Swedish case. Whereas the Swedish and English experiences share the presence of booming
populations after 1750, the French case is deemed as atypical in that there the transition
occurred smoothly, with only a moderate and brief burst of population growth. The pecu-
liarity that sets the French experience apart is that falling death rates were accompanied by
compensating falls in fertility, thus failing to produce the manifest acceleration of natural
rates observed elsewhere within the century after 1750.
The aim of this paper is to investigate the role of di¤erent factors in shaping the demo-
graphic transformations underway since the mid/late 18th century in European countries.
The focus is on three such factors: mortality, technological progress, and the costs of bear-
ing and rearing children. The speci…c goal is to assess the importance of each of these
1As argued in detail by Chesnais (1992,p142) and Livi-Bacci (1997,p115).
2factors in explaining both the features of the demographic transition over time and the
observed di¤erences across the Swedish, English and French national experiences.
The analysis is conducted within the framework of a competitive neoclassical economy
where- as in Barro and Becker (1989) - dynastic altruism is identi…ed as the motivating
force for capital accumulation and fertility choices. The approach is quantitative and the
conclusions are judged by their ability to quantitatively match the observed paths for se-
lected economic and demographic variables. A parametric setting is considered such that
the model’s equilibrium is consistent with empirically motivated …gures for a typical West-
ern economy in its pre-transition steady-state. Similarly, another version of the economy is
calibrated to observations that correspond to the typical developed economy in the post-
transition steady-state. Then the paths for mortality rates, technological change and the
child-cost parameter are calibrated so that the transition between these two steady-states
features the best match to Swedish productivity growth, while accurately replicating the
observed paths for the natural rate of increase of population and mortality rates
Two types of experiments are conducted on this setup. The …rst experiment considers
alternative paths for mortality, technological change and child-costs to evaluate the im-
portance of the changes in each for the explanation of the Swedish transition. The second
experiment is similar but uses direct observations on vital statistics for England and France
to study how di¤erences in the behavior of mortality, technology and child-costs provide
an interpretation of the diversity of patterns in the natural growth rate of population.
A brief summary of the main results is as follows. Throughout the period 1740-1985,
accompanying the rise in the growth rate of technology and the decline in mortality rates,
the cost of children must have featured a pronounced U-shape that reaches its trough
between 1880-1914. Concerning national experiences, di¤erences in the speed of mortality
declines canexplainsome of the di¤erences in the observed transitions. Asigni…cant part of
the di¤erences, though, must be attributedto the diversity inthe evolutionof the child-cost
factor.
The maincontributionofthis paperisto providea quantitatively-orientedinterpretation
of the historical demographic transition in Europe within a version of Barro and Becker
(1989) model. The quantitative approach to demographic analysis is also a characteristic
of Moe (1998), Hansen and Prescott (1998), Fernandez-Villaverde (1999), and Eckstein et
al (1999). The focus on historical data is a feature of the last three papers. Unlike the
3present paper, Fernandez-Villaverde (1999) does not analyze quantitatively the transition
and focuses on a more restricted set of facts. Eckstein et al. (1999) use detailed Swedish
data on mortality and fertility to estimate and analyze a non-altruistic life-cycle partial-
equilibriummodel withexogenous wages and no capital accumulation. Inthe presentpaper,
I use instead low-frequency observations for three countries to calibrate and simulate the
transitional dynamics ofa dynasticgeneral-equilibriummodel ofcapital accumulation. This
literature will be further discussed at the end of the paper.
This paper alsorelates toliterature on the demographic transitionthat departs from the
neoclassical technology and/or dynastic preferences assumed here. This literature includes
Becker et al. (1990), Ehrlich and Lui (1991), Dahan and Tsiddon (1998), Galor and Weil
(1996), andGalorandWeil (2000). These works containimportantinsights intotherelation
between economic and demographic changes, but their implications havenotbeen evaluated
with a quantitative approach.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 documents the facts to be
explained. Section 3 presents the model and characterizes the household’s optimal choices.
Section 4 characterizes the equilibrium and outlines some steady-state e¤ects of parameter
changes. Section 5 calibrates the model’s benchmark economy. Section 6 reports the
results of the numerical experiments and discusses the …ndings. Section 7 ends the paper
with conclusions and directions for future research.
2 The Facts
The natural rate of increase (NRI) is the rate of increase in population per 1000 population
over one year due to the natural processes of births and deaths only. The NRI is thus
calculated as the di¤erence between the crude birth rate (CBR) and crude death rate
(CDR). The CBR is the number of births in a year per thousand population. The CDR
is calculated in a similar way. These measures are crude indeed, but are the most widely
available indicators across regions and periods. The sources of the data used in this section
are described in Appendix A.
The earliest date for which complete yearly …gures of crude rates are available for
England, SwedenandFrance is 1740. For Englandthere is ample evidenceextendingfurther
back to 1541, and I will use this evidence to help characterize the conditions prevailing in
4the pre-transitional period. Figure 1 displays the HP-…ltered (with parameter 100) long
annual series of CBR’s and CDR’s for England. Before 1740, there does not seem to be any
lasting trend, while ‡uctuations in crude rates appear to be large. 35-year average annual
rates of natural growth per 1000 population are 7.136, 8.809, 5.953, 1.275, 2.755 and 3.428
over the periods 1541-1575, 1576-1610, 1611-1645, 1646-1680, 1681-1715 and 1716-1750
respectively. The average is some 4.9 per thousand population. This …gure seems to be
highly in‡uenced by the sharp dropinmortality during the century after 1575. It is di¢cult
to say whether this is a permanent feature of the pre-transitional regime or part of a cycle
that that can be traced further back in time. If, to remove this in‡uence, attention is
focused on the late part of that period, the average NRI over 1646-1750 is 2.5 per 1000,
more in line with the …gure of 3 of Lucas (1998) [reported in Hansen and Prescott (1998)].
A more modest rate seems also to be consistent with the impressionistic accounts of an
almost perfect balance between mortality and fertility characteristic of the times preceding
the modern world in, for example, Coale and Watkins (1986).
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Figure 1: CDR and CBR for England, 1541-1984. HP-…ltered annual series with parameter 100.
Figure 1 also shows that the mid 18th century constitutes a turning point in the secular
behavior of demographic series that will lead the way towards lasting reductions in fertility
and mortality rates. That this is also a momentous period for Sweden and France cannot be
5read from analogous data, but the consensus amongdemographers is that the breakthrough
must be dated around 1750. Hence this paper focuses on the developments that set o¤ at
that time.
Figures 2 through 4 display the HP-…ltered annual CBR’s and CDR’s over 1740-1985.
Inthe three countries, there is a secular trend towards lower mortality. Concerning fertility,
the di¤erences across the three countries are more apparent. In England, the fertility rate
rises and stays above pre-transitional values for over a century before the onset of the
declining trend. In Sweden, instead, the fertility rate remains fairly stable during the
period that precedes the decided downturn underway since 1875. Whereas in England and
Sweden the paths for the CBR and CDR are dissociated over much of the period, the
pattern in France is of a near balance between births and deaths. The declines in death
rates are matched by falls in fertility right from the outset.
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Figure 2: CDR and CBR for Sweden, 1740-1984. HP-…ltered annual series with parameter 100.
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Figure 3: CDR and CBR for England, 1740-1984. HP-…ltered annual series with parameter 100.
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Figure 4: CDR and CBR for France, 1740-1984. HP-…ltered annual series with parameter 100.
The separate experiences in crude rates are re‡ected in the implied paths for the NRI.
These are represented in …gure 5 below. Sweden displays moderately rising NRI’s until the
mid 1800’s, then an acceleration that subsides by 1914 and gives way to the characteristic
7declining trend since. Compared with the Swedish case, England’s experience is notorious
by its early acceleration in the NRI, which can be traced back to the mid 1700’s. The
English NRI’s move into step with the Swedish …gures by the mid 1800’s. France undergoes
a comparatively stable transition in terms of the NRI, with only a brief and modest burst
in the 1820’s.
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Figure 5: NRI for Sweden, England and France, 1740-1984. HP-…ltered annual series with
parameter 100.
For the analysis of this paper, it will prove convenient to focus on 35-year average
…gures. Following this convention, the data displayed in …gure 5 is summarized in Table 1.
Table 1. Natural Rate of Increase (NRI).
35-year annual averages per 1000, 1740-1984
period England France Sweden
1740-1774 6.09 2.71 5.16
1775-1809 11.35 2.93 5.84
1810-1844 14.73 4.99 7.9
1845-1879 12.68 2.49 11.61
1880-1914 12.02 1.14 10.56
1915-1949 6.04 0.39 5.94
1950-1984 3.55 5.79 5.12
One of the factors of interest in explaining NRI’s will be the changes in mortality. The
8CDR provides a rough approximation to the history of vital statistics, but it is a measure
plagued with composition e¤ects. For the purposes of the analysis, it will be convenient to
gather direct information on survival probabilities of agents within di¤erent age groups. In
particular, life-tables provide the data that permits to construct the probability of survival
between ages 1 and 40 for the corresponding cohort. Consistently with the notation to be
used later in the model, I let ¼ denote this probability. The probability that a member of
the cohort dies after age 15, conditional on dying between ages 1 and 40, °, can also be
calculated. The series that can be constructed from available sources are summarized in
table 2 below. Figures in italics for England indicate entries that were constructed with
indirect information as documented in Appendix A.
Table 2. Survival probability between age 1 and 40 (¼) and
probability that non-survivors die past age 15 (°)
period ¼ °
Sweden
1778-1782 0.607 0.509
1783-1812 0.614 0.568
1813-1847 0.678 0.608
1848-1882 0.698 0.546
1883-1917 0.774 0.624
1918-1952 0.881 0.700
1953-1965 0.967 0.756
England
1740-1779 0.641 0.627
1780-1809 0.678 0.650
1861-1881 0.673 0.604
1891-1911 0.772 0.577
1921-1947 0.884 0.687
1950-1963 0.965 0.776
France
1851-1878 0.628 0.599
1879-1913 0.727 0.651
1920-1947 0.846 0.744
1949-1965 0.953 0.795
Against the gradual trend in Sweden, the improvements in England were rapid over
the second half of the 1700’s, but were then interrupted over much of the 19th century.
In France, survival rates seem to catch up at least since the mid 1800’s. Inspection of
CDR’s in …gure 6 shows a similar picture. In Sweden the decline appears to be continuous
whereas England seems to go through stages, becoming relatively ‡at between 1840-1880
9and steeper afterwards. In France, the lasting declines in mortality seem to have started
earlier and from higher levels. Although France tends to catch up with its neighbors by
1840, the mortality rate remains consistently higher throughout.
It is also instructive tolook at the series for infant survival rates (probability of surviving
to age 1) which extend back to periods for which complete life-tables are not available. As
…gure 7 shows, secular improvements in Sweden start by the early 1800’s. In England there
is an earlier improvement in the second half of the 18th century, which ‡attens out during
much of the 19th century, only to resume the rising trend after 1880 or so. France starts
out with the lowest infant survival rates in the mid 1800’s, although the gap has been
narrowing down since.
The patterns of mortality change that have been reported here are consistent with the
accounts in the specialized literature such as Vallin (1991), Perrenoud (1991), Chesnais
(1992, p55), and Anderson (1996,p217-24).
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Figure 6:CDR for Sweden, England and France, 1740-1984. HP-…ltered annual series with
parameter 100.
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Figure 7: Infant survival rates for Sweden, England and France.
Finally, the periodconsideredis one of unprecedented improvements inliving standards.
Table 3 displays growth rates of productivity. Casual evidence suggests that productivity
surged …rst in England, the fruits of the Industrial Revolution spreading to the rest of
countries with some lag. It is visible, however, that France and Sweden exhibit faster
growth of productivity at least since the mid 1800’s.
Table 3. Productivity Growth
England Sweden France
period annual% 35-year annual% 35-year annual% 35-year
factor factor factor
1700-1780 0.27 1.1
1780-1820 0.43 1.16
1820-1870 1.156 1.495
1870-1913 1.225 1.532 1.744 1.831 1.584 1.733
1913-1950 1.583 1.733 2.767 2.599 1.927 1.950
1950-1987 2.866 2.688 3.348 3.166 4.202 4.223
1870-1987 1.855 1.903 2.573 2.433 2.514 2.385
113 The model
The analytical framework is a version of the neoclassical model of growth with endoge-
nous fertility in Barro and Becker (1989). The two modi…cations are the introduction of
mortality-risk and a simpli…ed treatment of the cost of children. This section presents the
assumptions of the model and analyzes the decision problem of the households.
3.1 Demographic structure
The agents in the economy can live for two periods: young age and adulthood. The
economy is populated by a continuum of households, each consisting of possibly one adult
and his heirs. I denote generations by the period when their members are born. At time
t ¡ 1 a number Nt¡1 of children are born and become young. This value is net of early
infant mortality. A member of generation t¡ 1 survives to period t with probability ¼t¡1.
Thus only ¼t¡1Nt¡1 agents belonging to generation t ¡ 1 will reach adulthood. In turn,
generation t¡ 1 bears Nt e¤ective children. The adult population growth factor between
two consecutive generations t and t+1 , gt, is thus
gt ´
¼tNt
¼t¡1Nt¡1
(1)
For the sake of de…ning consistent measures, let a model’s period correspond to 35 years.
Then, the NRI per thousand population between t and t+ 1 can be computed as
NRIt =
￿
Nt¼t + Nt+1
Nt¡1¼t¡1 + Nt
¡ 1
¸
1000
35
=
2
4
gt¼t
³
1+
gt+1
¼t+1
´
gt + ¼t
¡ 1
3
5 1000
35
: (2)
The behavior of this variables is the primary focus of this paper. Note …rst that, given the
paths for gt and survival rates ¼t, the de…nition of the NRI does not require to measure
infant mortality rates.2 Second, without further assumptions, the ambiguous e¤ect of gt
and ¼t on NRIt is re‡ective of natural compositional e¤ects.
A member of generation t¡1 plans to have given birth to nt children by the end of his
2The values of CBR and CDR do depend on the infant mortality rate, but it nets out when calculating
the NRI as CBR-CDR.
12…rst life-time period t¡1. This planned fertility is net of infant mortality. If he survives to
adulthood, with probability ¼t¡1, then the plan will be e¤ectively implemented. However,
conditional on that he dies before completing adulthood, which occurs with probability
1 ¡ ¼t¡1, the fertility plan can only be carried out if premature death does not occur too
soon, which is the case with probability °t¡1. That is, °t¡1 is the probability of carrying
out the planned fertility conditional on not reaching adulthood. It follows that the motion
for the ‡ow of births is
Nt = Nt¡1nt[¼t¡1 + °t¡1(1 ¡ ¼t¡1)] (3)
As a consequence, the adult population growth factor between t and t+1 in Eq.(1) can be
written as
gt =
¼t
¼t¡1
nt[¼t¡1+ °(1 ¡¼t¡1)] (4)
When mortality and planned fertility have constant values the growth rate of total popu-
lation, NRI £ (35=1000), coincides that of adult population, g ¡ 1.
3.2 Technology
A single sector produces …nal output. The total amount of capital, Kt, and labor units,
Lt, are the inputs employed in period t to produce total output through a neoclassical
production function, F(Kt;AtLt). It will be assumed that F(:;:) is Cobb-Douglas with 0 <
µ < 1 being the output share of capital, and At representing labor-augmenting technology,
F(Kt;AtLt) = Kµ
t(AtLt)1¡µ (5)
Technology is assumed to grow at a rate xt ¡ 1 between period t and t+ 1,
xt =
At+1
At
(6)
Output produced at t can be used for consumption Ct, for accumulation of next-period
capital Kt+1, or for producing children. Capital depreciates at the rate ± < 1. Each birth
is assumed to imply a goods-cost. This cost amounts to At´t for every born child. Since
13the number of births at t is Nt, total child-rearing expenditures amount to At´tNt.
Finally, it remains to specify the technology for rearing children. Many authors argue
thatchild-rearingis intensiveintime. Inthis case, theterm ´t shouldre‡ecttheopportunity
cost of the parental time, as in Barro and Becker (1989). Here it is assumed that children
entail a cost in terms of goods only. This cost may depend on the level of the economy-wide
capital per worker though. With some abuse of notation, then one can can write
´t = ´t(^ kt) (7)
with ^ kt being capital per e¤ective worker, ^ kt = Kt=(AtLt). Note this formulation admits
that the child-cost be proportional to the technology-adjusted wage as in Barro and Becker
(1989). By assuming it is a goods-cost rather than a time-cost, however, I rule out the
impact of changes of fertility on hours of labor supplied. This simpli…es the explicit com-
putation of the model’s transitional dynamics. The time index in ´t(:) accounts for the
possibility that the parameters of this function change over time.
3.3 Households
Individual agents make choices on fertility and capital transfers. This section describes the
household’s environment and characterizes the optimal choices.
The budget constraint
An agent of generation t¡ 1 receives at t¡ 1 a claim on the amount of wealth kt from
his parents. In the …rst period of his life, this wealth is allocated between two assets named
conditional annuities, st, and simple annuities, at. Simple annuities will pay at t a rate of
return Ra
t only if he survives. A conditional annuity will pay a rate of return Rs
t except if
he dies and, additionally, does not have any children, in which case it will pay nothing. For
example, if °t¡1 = 1 conditional annuities yield a return with certainty and are equivalent
to simple annuities. If the agent dies before period t but leaves descendants, the return
on conditional annuities is devoted to cover the rearing cost of his heirs, ntAt´t, and to
provide them with accidental bequests, adding up to ntkA
t+1. If he survives to period t, then
he receives the returns from his total wealth and labor income and spends the revenues on
ownconsumption, child-rearing and wealth accumulationin the form of voluntary bequests,
14ntkV
t+1.
More formally, the portfolio choice at time t¡1 by the agent of cohort t¡1 must satisfy
the constraint st + at = kt. In the event that she dies and has children, which happens
with probability (1 ¡ ¼t¡1)°t¡1, accidental bequests to generation t are determined by
Rs
tst = ntkA
t+1+ntAt´t, where At´t is the expenditure on each child and kA
t+1 represents the
wealth received by each child that survives up to period t+1. Here and after all prices are
expressed in terms of the …nal good. If she lives up to the second period t, then she faces
the constraint ct = wt + Rs
tst + Ra
tat ¡ ntkV
t+1 ¡ ntAt´t. Here ct is her consumption, wt is
labor income and kV
t+1 is the bequest received by each of her children. The budget set for
an agent of cohort t ¡ 1 is given by the three last expressions. They can be combined to
get a more compact expression,
ct = wt + R
a
tkt ¡ nt
Ra
t
Rs
t
At´t ¡ ntk
V
t+1 ¡ ntk
A
t+1
µ
Ra
t
Rs
t
¡ 1
¶
: (8)
Preferences and the decision problem
The preferences of an individual of cohort t¡ 1 re‡ect a concern for the welfare of all
future descendants. Generations are linked through parental altruism which is materialized
in the form of intergenerational transfers of wealth. Let Vt¡1 denote the utility attained
by a typical member of generation t¡ 1 from the perspective of time t¡ 1. The following
separable speci…cation is assumed,
Vt¡1 ´ E
£
u(ct) + ¯n1¡²
t Vt j t ¡1
¤
= ¼t¡1u(ct) +¯E
£
n1¡²
t Vt j t¡ 1
¤
(9)
where E is the expectation operator. This formulation assumes that a parent’s utility
depends on her own consumption, on the number of children, and the utility of each child.
As of period t¡1, there is uncertainty about outcomes, so utility is evaluated in expected
terms. Expenditures on children do not enter utility but only adult consumption does
through u(:).3 The discount term re‡ects that individuals care about the welfare of every
3For the sake of tractability, models with altruistic preferences often assume that the number of children
enters separately with the utility of the children [see, for instance Razin and Ben-Zion (1975) and Palivos
(1995)]. On the other hand, the assumption that parents’ instantaneous utility does not depend on the
number of children is relaxed in Barro and Sala-i- Martin (1995,Ch7). Actually, in their formulation,
dropping this additional component of utility from children precludes any dynamics for fertility, at least
15child. It is assumed that ² > 0, and ² > 1 if utility is negative.4 The instantaneous utility
function u(:) is assumed to take on the following CRRA speci…cation,
u(c) =
1
1¡ ¾
c
1¡¾; with ¾ > 0: (10)
Households take as given labor income, asset returns and mortality risk. It is assumed
that the per-child cost is also exogenously given to the household.5 Now members of
generation t ¡ 1 make their choices on the …rst period t ¡ 1 under uncertainty. For the
preferences in (9) and (10), given a value kt of wealth, the values ct, kA
t+1, kV
t+1 and nt are
determined as the solution to the Bellman equation,
Vt¡1(kt) = max
©
¼t¡1u(ct) +¯E[n
1¡²
t Vt(kt+1)]
ª
= max
©
¼t¡1u(ct) +¯n
1¡²
t [¼t¡1Vt(k
V
t+1) +(1 ¡ ¼t¡1)°t¡1Vt(k
A
t+1)]
ª
(11)
subject to the budget constraint (8). Although the problem is stationary I keep the sub-
scripts in the value function for clarity.
One can show(seeappendix B) that, withcompetitiveinsurance market, the equilibrium
asset returns Ra and Rs are actuarially fair. There is then full insurance against lifetime
uncertainty so that kt+1 = kA
t+1 = kV
t+1 and the FOC’s for the choice of kt+1 can be written
as,
ntu
0(ct) = ¯n
1¡²
t Rt+1u
0(ct+1) (12)
where Rt+1 is the return on one-period securities.6
when ´a = 0.
4Barro and Becker (1989) assume ² < 1. The current formulation allows us to accommodate relative
risk aversion greater than one, a point also made by Alvarez (1999,ft2).
5In Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995,Ch7) the alternative assumption is made. I think the assumption
made here accords better with existing theories.
6An extended-family arrangement, as in Ehrlich and Lui (1991), could also have been assumed as an
alternative to markets for annuities. Each extended family is composed of a large number of identical
households with independent prospects of survival. This mechanism would ensure bequests to every child
whether he is orphan or not by assuming that an implicit contract concerning intra-family transfers is
enforced. In a di¤erent model, Ehrlich and Lui (1991) show that, with a trigger-strategy penalty on the
defectors, such type of contracts are self-enforcing. The parallel analysis has not been carried out here.
As one referee rightly pointed out, either assumption rules out a potentially important role for capital
market imperfections, and the assumptions made are justi…ed on grounds of analytical convenience. In the
absence of such insurance institutional arrangements, life-time uncertainty would command variation in
the distribution of wealth. See Loury (1981) and Fuster (1999) on this matter.
16The budget constraint (8) can be posed as,
ct = wt + Rt
kt
¼t¡1
¡
µ
At´t
¼t
+
kt+1
¼t
¶
¼t
¼t¡1
nt(¼t¡1 + (1¡ ¼t¡1)°t¡1): (13)
The present full-insurance setupimplies that, for agiven real returnon equity, mortality
risk does not in‡uence optimal intertemporal choices. The net result is that the condition
for intergenerational optimality (12) is not in‡uenced by mortality risk.7
Fertility choice
Since there is full insurance, one can write the value function in (11) as,
Vt¡1(kt) = max
©
¼t¡1u(ct)+ ¯n
1¡²
t (¼t¡1 +(1 ¡ ¼t¡1)°t¡1)Vt(kt+1)
ª
;
the maximization being subject to the constraint in (13). For the choice on nt to be well
de…ned, the condition (1¡ ¾)=(¾¡ ²) > 0 has to be satis…ed. Therefore, ² > ¾ if and only
if ¾ > 1. The optimal choice of nt balances the cost of an additional descendant in terms
of parent’s utility and the gain in future generations’ utility. Using the speci…cation of u(:)
in (10), appendix B shows that the solution is characterized by
ct+1 =
1 ¡ ¾
¾ ¡ ²
￿
Rt+1
At´t
¼t
¡ wt+1
¸
: (14)
The conditions (12-(14) characterize the household’s behavior provided that the implied
utility value is bounded.
4 Equilibrium
For analytical convenience, using Eq.(4) the equilibrium is de…ned in terms of the growth
rate of the labor force, gt, and per-unit-of-e¤ective-worker variables.
De…nition: Given f(:), ±, ¯, ¾, ², f´t(:);xt;¼t;°tg1
t=0 and ^ k0, a perfect foresight (PF)
competitive equilibrium consists of sequences of quantities for capital per e¤ective worker
7In Ehrlich and Lui (1991) the return from investing in children’s human capital is positively related
to survival probabilities and this determines the positive e¤ect of mortality rates reductions on economic
outcomes and the tendency of fertility to decline over time. On the contrary, in the current setup the
relevant return on investment is independent of survival rates. Preston (1980, p.324-326)’s calculations
imply that, to a …rst approach, this assumption may not be grossly misleading.
17^ kt, consumption per e¤ective worker ^ ct, adult population growth gt and prices wt, rt, Rt
for t = 0;1;2;::: such that: taking rt and wt as given, …rms maximize pro…ts; taking Rt
and wt as given, households maximize their dynastic utility; returns on capital and debt
are equalized (no-arbitrage); all markets clear.
Market clearing implies that total wealth equals the aggregate capital stock. Since all
households are assumed to be identical, Kt = Nt¡1kt. Each adult provides one unit of
labor so that Lt = Nt¡1¼t¡1. Then ^ kt ´ Kt=(AtLt) = kt=(At¼t¡1). Output per e¤ective
worker is then f(^ kt) ´ F(^ kt;1). The no-arbitrage condition implies that Rt = 1 ¡ ± + rt.
Maximization by competitive …rms leads to rt = f0(^ kt) and wt = At[f(^ kt)¡^ ktf0(^ kt)]. Thus
we can represent the equilibrium wage rate and the rental rate of capital as Aw(^ k) and
r(^ k), respectively.
Then clearing in output market, F(Kt;AtLt) + (1 ¡ ±)Kt = Ct + Kt+1 + NtAt´t or,
equivalently, the household’s budget constraint (13), can be written as
f(^ kt) +(1 ¡ ±)^ kt = ^ ct + gt
Ã
^ kt+1xt +
´t(^ kt)
¼t
!
; t = 0;1;2;:::; (15)
Optimal fertility in (14) dictates
^ ct =
1¡ ¾
¾ ¡ ²
"
(1¡ ± + r(^ kt))
´t¡1(^ kt¡1)
xt¡1¼t¡1
¡ w(^ kt)
#
; t = 1;2;::: (16)
and the …rst-order condition for intertemporal allocation of consumption (12) can be posed
as
gt =
¼t
¼t¡1
(¼t¡1 +°t¡1(1 ¡ ¼t¡1))[¯(1¡ ± + r(^ kt+1)]
1=²
µ
^ ct+1
^ ct
xt
¶¡¾=²
; t = 0;1;2;::: (17)
where use has been made of (4) to substitute nt away. The term ´t(^ k) will now be speci…ed
as
´t(^ k) = ´at + ´btw(^ k); with ´at;´bt ¸ 0: (18)
Thus an equilibrium is described by paths for ^ kt, ^ ct and gt that satisfy the four equations
(15)-(18) abovefor giveninitial capital intensity, ^ k0 and a ^ c0 consistent with the appropriate
18transversality condition. Under the functional forms assumed, f(^ k) = ^ kµ, r(^ k) = µ^ kµ¡1 and
w(^ k) = (1¡ µ)^ kµ. The description of the equilibrium is completed by a condition ensuring
that the household’s utility is not unbounded for the paths implied by the above equations.
The discussion of this condition will be conducted in terms of steady-state outcomes.8
De…ne a steady-state as an equilibrium where all per unit-of-e¤ective-worker variables,
prices and fertility and mortality rates remain constant over time. A steady-state is char-
acterized by the following set of equations,
¤(^ k) ´ f(^ k)+ (1¡ ±)^ k ¡ ^ c(^ k) ¡ (^ kx+
´(^ k)
¼
)g(^ k) = 0 (19)
with
^ c(^ k) =
1¡ ¾
¾ ¡ ²
"
(1 ¡ ± +r(^ k))
´(^ k)
x¼
¡ w(^ k)
#
(20)
g(^ k) = (¼ +°(1 ¡ ¼))[¯(1 ¡± +r(^ k))]1=²x¡¾=² (21)
and
´(^ k) = ´a + ´bw(^ k): (22)
Bounded utility requires the condition shown in appendix C that
g(^ k)x < 1 ¡ ± +r(^ k): (23)
As in Barro and Becker (1989), there may be multiplicity of steady-states. Although the
number of steady-states cannot be bounded analytically, none of the numerical setups
considered in this research has been found to have more than two steady-states. The
8The equilibrium has a similar structure to the one studied in Barro and Becker (1989). The presence
of the life-uncertainty terms, ¼ and °, makes one di¤erence. The other di¤erence concerns the speci…cation
of the determination for the child-cost term ´(:) as a goods cost, which simpli…es the economy’s dynamic
structure.
19equilibrium system is of second-order as long as ´bt is positive.9 Local stability analysis has
been performed by studying the two roots of the linearized system. Although analytical
results have not been obtained, the linearized system has been investigated numerically.
For all the economies considered in this research, the condition ¤0(^ k) > 0 [see de…nition in
Eq.(19)] characterizes saddle-path stable steady-states.10
The steady-state e¤ects of a change in the rate of technical progress and the child-cost
are already discussed in Barro and Becker (1989). A higher rate of technical progress, x,
implies, by Eq.(17), a steeper pro…le for consumption which, for given r, calls for lower
discount or lower fertility. But x may also lead to lower capital accumulation and a higher
interest which exerts the opposite e¤ect on equilibrium fertility. The e¤ects of changes
in the child-cost parameters on population growth are straightforward. The treatment
of mortality here is more elaborated than in Barro and Becker (1989), which opens new
theoretical possibilities. On one hand, higher survival probabilities have a direct impact on
the population growth rate [see Eq.(4)]. In this model, stable steady-states are such that
the marginal value of the increased quantity of children declines relative to the return from
quality. Therefore parents tend to increase the quality of the children which expresses itself
in larger transfers of capital per capita and, possibly, lower fertility. On the other hand,
however, increasing the survival rate implies a reduction of the perceived per-parent cost of
raising and endowing a given amount of children. This price-e¤ect induces a substitution
of quantity for quality of children which tends to increase fertility rates. The net result
depends on the relative importance of the two e¤ects. When mortality drops happen to be
concentrated at advanced adult ages (° large), the impact on population growth is small
and the cost reduction or substitution e¤ect dominates.11 On the contrary, when young
people is the groupexperiencingmajordrops (° small), then it is morelikely that increasing
survival rates drive the economy to higher levels of output per head along with, possibly,
lower plannedfertility rates. The latter is clearly a necessary condition for adult population
growth to fall after a reduction of mortality risk. In general, speci…c statements about the
implications of changes in parameters can only be made in a quantitative version of the
9In Barro and Becker (1989), where children involve a time cost, the system is of third order.
10These results are consistent with those conjectured in Barro and Becker (1989). Discussion of existence
and stability are available from the author.
11The implicit assumption in Barro and Becker (1989)’s discussion is that ° = 1
20model.12
5 Calibration
This section determines the parameters of the benchmark economy that will be used for the
analysis. The working hypothesis is that the economies under study were all at a steady-
state before the changes operated at about 1740, and that they converge towards a new
steady-state that is consistent with post-transition …gures. Furthermore, it is assumed that
the three economies [Sweden, England, and France] are alike at both the pre-transitional
and the post-transitional steady-states. This will permit to focus the analysis on the factors
shaping the transition between the two steady-states. The parameters to be determined
thus are two sets of steady-state parameters, and sequences for the parameters that are
allowed to change over time. These time-varying parameters are the child-cost parameters,
the survival probabilities, and the rate of technological change. Whereas the steady-state
parameters are chosen to match the average behavior of a typical western economy, the
sequences of parameters are calibrated to transition observations for Sweden. Sweden is
chosenas thebenchmark for theevidencereviewedin section2indicates this is the"normal"
case that lies between the two more extreme experiences of England and France.
5.1 Steady-state calibration
At a steady-state, the parameters of the model are ¼, °, µ, ±, x, ¾, ¯, ², ´a, and ´b. The
procedure to pin down these numbers for the …nal, or post-transition, steady-state is the
following.
1. Assume that the model’s period corresponds to 35-years. Set directly ¼ = 1 (so °
becomes irrelevant), µ = 0:4, ± = 1:0, ¾ = 3 and x = 2:0.
2. Set targets g = 1 and, for the investment-output ratio,
I=Y = [gx +(1¡ ±)]^ k1¡µ = 0:15
12Detailed analysis of the consequences of changes in ¼ and ° can be found in an early working paper
version available from the author.
21toderive ^ k inthesteady-state. Use(21) andR = r+1¡± = µ^ kµ¡1+1¡± = (1+0:049)35
to calculate
¯ =
x¾
R
= 1:501
3. Set target 0.588 for the share of cost of one child on adult consumption. Using (19)
and (20),
0:588 =
´(^ k)(g=¼)
1¡¾
¾¡²
h
(1 ¡± +r(^ k))
´(^ k)
¼x ¡ w(^ k)
i;
or
² = ¾ ¡ 0:588(1 ¡ ¾)
(1¡ ± + r(^ k))
´(^ k)
¼x ¡ w(^ k)
´(^ k)
:
Calibrate ´(:) and " according to these conditions and that the steady-state produces
the target g = 1. For the speci…cation in Eq.(18), ´(^ k) = ´0 + ´1(1 ¡ µ)^ kµ, there
exists one degree of freedom for the choices of ´a or ´b. I set ´a = 0.
The choices in step 1 are justi…ed as follows. I will consider a …nal steady-state where
survival rates are virtually hundred percent. The capital share is assumed to be 40% as
in Cooley and Prescott (1997). Given the period length of 35 years, a depreciation rate
of hundred percent seems reasonable. The coe¢cient of risk-aversion of 3 is in the middle
range of values used in the literature. The assumptionof 2% long-run growth per year leads
to x = (1 + 0:02)35 = 2. In step 2, I target a zero-growth population. The investment-
output ratio is close to the average for developed countries over the last two-decades. Note
the implied gross return of 5% is not o¤ the mark. Step 3 uses the equivalence Oxford
scale, which weights the …rst adult as 1, the second by 0.7, and each children as 0.5 [see
Van Praag and Warnaar (1997)]. Since the model has single households, the share of the
cost of a child in adult consumption can be calculated as (0:5 £ 2)=(1+ 0:7) = 0:588. To
resolve the indeterminacy, I will arbitrarily assume ´a = 0 for the benchmark case. The
arbitrary choices in this calibration are thus ´a = 0 and ¾ = 3. They should be the focus
of robustness analysis.
I will analyze the transition of economies towards the long-run post-transition steady-
state just described, starting from the pre-transition steady-state. The assumption is that
only the parameters ¼, °, ´(:) and x have changed since the mid 18th century. To calibrate
their values at the initial steady-state, one needs observations about the pre-transitional
22situation in England, France and Sweden. Motivated by the discussion on pre-industrial
…gures in section 2, a target for the population growth increase of 3.0 per 1000 per year
seems reasonable. For the model’s 35-year periods, the target is thus set to g = 1:11. On
the other hand, x = 1:0 as output has remained largely stagnant before the Industrial
Revolution. The benchmark observations for Sweden in the mid 1700’s in table 2 point
to a choice ¼ = 0:6 and ° = 0:50. Note here ¼ is taken to represent survival probability
between age 1 and 40, and ° is interpreted as the conditional probability of dying after age
15 provided that deathoccurs between ages 1 and 40. Finally, the benchmark economy will
be characterized by a choice of ´b that is consistent with the target for g. This calibration
involves an annual interest rate of 2.4%, smaller than the 5% of the …nal steady-state.
Other studies, such as Hansen and Prescott (1998), entertain similar implications for the
interest rate. Table 4 summarizes the choices of steady-state parameters.
Table 4. Calibration steady-states
Constant ¾ µ ± ¯ "
3.0 0.4 1.0 1.1488 3.78
Changing x ¼ ° ´a ´b
Initial g = 1:11: 1.0 0.6 0.50 0 0.335
Final g = 1:0: 2.0 1.0 1.0 0 0.5
The changes betweenthetwosteady-states re‡ect theinterplay ofsomekey comparative-
static e¤ects of the benchmark economy. The e¤ect of the increase in survival probabilities
between the initial and …nal stead-states would, on its own, lead to higher population
growth and lower capital intensity. Thus, in spite of the theoretical case made at the end
of section 4, the model rules out the possibility that the reduction in mortality can explain
the broad characteristics of the demographic transition. This result appears to be robust
to changes in parameter settings. Other factors must have contributed to the net transfor-
mations operated. The observed rise in technical progress alone does indeed lead to lower
population growth along with lower capital intensity. But the net e¤ect of the observed
joint changes in mortality and technical change leads to a …nal population growth rate that
exceeds the benchmark zero-growth case. Thus, a net increase in the child-cost parameter
is needed. This tends to partly balance the negative e¤ect of faster technical change and
lower mortality on capital intensity.
235.2 Calibrating the transition
This section describes the procedure leading to the choice of the paths f¼t;°t;´bt;xtg over
the transition period. One has to establish a correspondence between the model’s periods
and historical dates. I will choose to map the model’s periods to historical 35-year intervals
for which the …gures of NRI were averaged and calculated in table 1. This is shown in the
following table 5.
Table 5. Correspondence model’s
periods and historical dating
Model Observations
-1 1670-1704
0 1705-1739
1 1740-1774
2 1775-1809
3 1810-1844
4 1845-1879
5 1880-1914
6 1915-1949
7 1950-1984
8 1985-2020
Periods -1 and 0 correspond to the pre-transition stage. The benchmark paths ¼t and °t
are set according to the information gathered in table 2 for Sweden. Those observation are
dated in the model using the correspondence in table 5 to match the dates of the historical
observations in table 2. Table 6 shows the calibrated paths.
Table 6. Calibrated Vital Statistics
period ¼t °t
-1 0.600 0.500
0 0.600 0.500
1 1778-1782 0.607 0.509
2 1783-1812 0.614 0.568
3 1813-1847 0.678 0.608
4 1848-1882 0.698 0.546
5 1883-1917 0.774 0.624
6 1918-1952 0.881 0.700
7 1953-1965 0.967 0.756
8 1.000 1.000
Now, whereas the paths for¼t and°t have beendeterminedfrom direct observations, the
two remaining paths for xt and ´bt are calibrated so that the implied transition is consistent
24with targets for the NRI and productivity growth. The target for the path of the NRI is
constructed from the Swedish …gures in table 1. I assume the NRI becomes zero after two
periods following 1984. Concerning average productivity growth, I will use the 35-year
average …gures in Table 3. However, …gures on early periods are missing for Sweden. I will
approximate thesemissing …gures using some indirectinformation. The…gures for GDPper
capita growth in Maddison (1991) indicate that during 1820-1870 Sweden’s productivity
growth rate must have been lower than England’s. Also, since technological progress from
Englandspreadwithsomedelay, onecouldassumea lagged startofproductivity increasesin
Sweden. Therefore I assume low productivity growth for the periods 1780-1820 and earlier
in Sweden. Chesnais (1992,p455) dates the …rst stages of industrialization and growth for
Scandinavian countries at the turn of the 19th century. Early writers date the beginning
of economic growth in England around 1760 [Chesnais (1992,p447, ft3)]. Scaling down the
English …gures in table 3, the calibration target for productivity adopted for the Swedish
benchmark obtains. Table 7 below shows the chosen targets for productivity growth and
the NRI. The entries in italics indicate the …gures that have been constructed from indirect
evidence.
Table 7. Calibration targets
for productivity growth and the NRI
Productivity
period NRI growth
0 3.14 1.0
1 5.16 1.011
2 5.84 1.011
3 7.90 1.25
4 11.61 1.40
5 10.56 1.83
6 5.94 2.60
7 5.12 3.17
8 3.00
9 1.00
10 0.00
Given the paths for ¼t and °t, and the target for NRIt, Eq.(2) permits to calculate
the path for gt that is consistent with that target. From a practical point of view, the
equivalent exercise of targeting gt rather than NRIt proves to be more convenient because
of the compositional e¤ects involvedinthe latter variable. A secondpractical observation is
25thatproductivity growthbetweent andt+1is calculated as xt(^ kt+1=^ kt)µ. Third, calibrating
´bt and xt requires to be able to compute the transition of the model when the system is
forced by changes in ¼t, °t, ´bt and xt over time. To perform these calculations, I assume
perfect foresight so that the changes set o¤ after period 0 are known and anticipated by
agents as of period 1. This seems a natural assumption given the low frequency of the
model’s implications. The system is saddle-path stable and the equilibrium path is found
using an iterative Gauss-Seidel type of algorithm. Details are provided in appendix D.
Now one can …nd the paths for the child cost and technology growth that are consistent
with the calibration targets in table 7 given the vital statistcs in table 6, which correspond
to the Swedishdemographictransition. The paths for ´b andx havebeen calibratedin order
to produce an accurate match of the NRI’s. There is a tension with matching the …gures
of productivity growth though. Indeed, only paths of productivity that underestimate
the targeted …gures are consistent with a good …t for the NRI. Conversely, paths that
are consistent with the high observed productivity growth rates will lead to NRI’s way
below the observations. The compromise adopted here is to pick out a setting that, being
consistent with the target NRI’s, gets as close as possible to the pattern of the target path
for productivity growth. One choice that satis…es this constraint is reproduced in table 8
below. For the sake of completeness, I also add paths of parameters that have already been
calibrated.
Table 8. Benchmark Paths for Parameters.
period ¼ ° x ´b
-1 0.600 0.500 1.000 0.335
0 0.600 0.500 1.000 0.335
1 0.607 0.510 1.011 0.335
2 0.614 0.568 1.100 0.170
3 0.678 0.608 1.350 0.220
4 0.698 0.546 1.450 0.200
5 0.774 0.624 2.200 0.130
6 0.881 0.700 2.300 0.180
7 0.967 0.756 2.200 0.280
8 1.000 1.000 1.750 0.320
9 1.000 1.000 1.850 0.440
10 1.000 1.000 1.900 0.500
11 1.000 1.000 2.001 0.500
The parameters in table 4 and the paths in table 8 characterize the benchmark choice.
26To provide a visual impression, these benchmark paths are depicted in …gure 8 below.
Figures 8a and 8b simply display the historical Swedish …gures for survival rates. Figure 8c
shows that stronggrowthof technology starts inperiod 3(1810-1844) and increases toreach
a peak that exceeds the long-run rate in period 6 (1915-1949). In periods 7 and 8 (1950-
2000), the growth of technology slows down to hit a low of 1.6% a year. Subsequently,
technological change moves up towards its long-run value of 2%. As displayed in …gure
8d, the evolution of the child-cost parameter has a clear U-shaped pro…le. Until period 5
(1880-1914) there is a marked reduction of the child-cost. After that, sharp increases set
the child-cost component well above its historical level by period 8 (1985-2020) towards its
long-run value.
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Figure 8. Exogenous benchmark parameters. (8a) ¼, (8b) °, (8c) x, and (8d) ´b.
Figure 9 below represents the paths for the key endogenous variables of the model that
are implied by the calibration considered, along with their targeted counterparts. In …gure
9a capital per e¢cient unit of labor falls sharply up to period 6 (1915-1949). This decline
is particularly dramatic in period 2 (1775-1809). Then it rises moderately towards its long-
run value. The simulated paths for g and the NRI in …gures 9b and 9c closely match their
targets. The main feature of the path for the NRI is a marked hump shape with a peak in
27period 4 (1845-1879). The growth rate of productivity exhibits a similar pattern, the peak
occurring in period 7 (1950-84). The match for productivity growth is far from perfect,
thus re‡ecting the tension in the calibration mentioned above.
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Figure 9. Endogenous benchmark paths. (9a) ^ k, (9b) g, (9c) NRI, and (9c) productivity growth.
The values indicated with * correspond to the benchmark calibration targets.
6 Numerical Experiments
This section explores the importance of the three exogenous factors considered in this
model— mortality, technological change, and child-costs— for the demographic transitions
that European countries have undergone. In the …rst part, I will focus on the Swedish
case as characterized by the benchmark economy calibrated in the previous section. The
exerciseconsiders deviations from the benchmark parametric paths inorder toevaluate how
the trajectories for the NRI and productivity growth are modi…ed. The second exercise
is similar but concerned with comparisons across national experiences. I will modify the
benchmark economy using data on vital statistics for England and France and information
of their productivity growth performances. This exercise will serve to assess how much of
28the di¤erences in NRI’s relative to Sweden must be attributed to these two factors and how
much to di¤erences in the evolution of the child-cost component.
6.1 Comparative dynamics
Inthis section, I will replace, one at a time, the benchmark trajectories for x, ´b, ¼ and ° by
smoothed paths that are still consistent with the benchmark initial and …nal steady-states.
I consider smooth paths that obtain by applying constant 35-year rates of increase of 0.09,
0.05, 0.07 and 0.09 to x, ´1, ¼ and ° respectively between period 0 and period 8. The
comparison of the outcomes with the ones in the benchmark case will provide an indication
of how important the particular features of the calibrated paths are for the evolution of the
NRI and productivity growth.
Figure 10a shows that in the benchmark setup technical change has been particularly
fast since 1880. Figure 10b suggests that the accelerating path for technological produc-
tivity has helped keep population rises under check. With a more uniform path for the
growth of technical change, fertility would have remained well above the benchmark values
since the late 19th century. Naturally, …gure 10c shows that the fast pace of technological
progress goes to explain part the observed high productivity-growth performance, but not
all. Accelerated productivity growth since the late 19th century is still a pervasive feature
of the transition even under the smooth path for technical change. In any case, the basic
pattern characteristic of the benchmark trajectories for the NRI and productivity growth
seems to be robust to variations in the evolution of technical change.
In …gure 11a, the benchmark path for the child-cost parameter di¤ers dramatically
from its smoothed version. Figure 11b reveals the paramount role of the pattern for the
child-cost parameter. The non-monotonic U-shaped pro…le assumed in the benchmark case
is strictly necessary to produce the hump-shaped pro…le for the NRI. Assuming that the
cost of children has risen gradually at an uniform pace implies a trajectory for the NRI
that is counterfactual even in its qualitative features. As shown in …gure 11c, the sharp
early declines in the child-cost component contributed to moderate the rate of productivity
growthduring the period before 1880. Conversely, the large increases in the child-cost since
the late 1800’s positively contributed to the acceleration of productivity growth observed
since.
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Figure 10. Comparison of benchmark paths (o) with the paths produced by an alternative path
for the rate of technical change x (*). (10a) x, (10b) NRI, and (10c) productivity growth.
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Figure 11. Comparison of benchmark paths (o) with the paths produced by an alternative path
30for the child-cost parameter ´b (*). (11a) ´b, (11b) NRI, and (11c) productivity growth.
Concerning survival probabilities, …gure 12a shows that the benchmark calibration im-
plies a relatively slow improvement over the …rst few periods of the transition, followed
by relatively fast increases afterwards. The survival rate remains, however, relatively low
throughout. This also applies to the comparison of the benchmark trajectory for ° and
its smoothed counterpart shown in …gure 13a. As displayed in …gures 12b and 13b, the
speci…c pattern of mortality does have a bearing on the behavior of population growth.
The smooth paths for survival probabilities lead to relatively higher NRI throughout the
central periods of the transition. Quantitatively, the e¤ect of ° appears to be smaller than
that of ¼. The e¤ect on population growth of changes in path for mortality goes beyond
the direct impact of mortality itself. This is shown in …gure 12d that compares the path
of planned fertility n in the benchmark calibration to the one obtained under the smooth
path for survival rates. Lower mortality rates increase net planned fertility. Finally, …gures
12c and 13c reveal that the economic consequences of the pattern of mortality changes over
the transition are minor.
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Figure 12. Comparison of benchmark paths (o) with the paths produced by an alternative path
for the survival rate ¼ (*). (12a) ¼, (12b) NRI, (12c) productivity growth, and (12d) n.
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Figure 13. Comparison of benchmark paths (o) with the paths produced by an alternative path
for the conditional survival rate ° (*). (13a) °, (13b) NRI, and (13c) productivity growth.
The main insights from preceding analysis can be summarized as follows. The existence
of a burst of population growth cannot be explained in the absence of sharp declines in the
child-cost component over the …rst periods of the transition. In e¤ect, departures from the
benchmark U-shaped child-cost path lead to counterfactual implications for the qualitative
pro…le of the NRI. This is because the contribution to population growth of the rising rate
of technical exchange is negative. Given that the e¤ect on the NRI of observed mortality
declines does not prove powerful enough, the size of reductions in the child-cost must have
been large at least until about 1880. Subsequently, rising costs have decisively contributed
to the falls in population growth and, to some extent, to the acceleration of productivity
growth through capital accumulation. In any case, mortality declines tend to boost the
NRI and, hence, their contribution to the observed size of early population rises must have
been positive. More rapid drops in mortality than observed would have delivered higher
NRI’s over the transition.
326.2 Comparing national experiences
Using data on vital statistics for England and France, I modify the benchmark economy
to identify the contribution of di¤erences in mortality paths to the di¤erent behavior of
the NRI in these countries relative to Sweden. After informally accounting for technology
disparities, the remaining di¤erences will have to be attributed to dissimilar trajectories for
the child-costs. Figure 14 below displays the summary data on NRI’s for Sweden, England
and France contained in table 1. According to the convention adopted (see table 5), the
…rst observation corresponds to period 1 in the model.
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Figure 14. Historical NRI for Sweden, England, and France. The …gures represented are 35-year
averages contained in Table 1.
6.2.1 The English Case
Here the focus is on interpreting the faster and larger burst in population growth in Eng-
land relative to Sweden. The following …gure 15 compares the survival probabilities of the
benchmark economy (Sweden) and the English economy. The …gures from England are
taken to be those shown in table 2 above, with interpolated values for the missing observa-
tions in period 3. These interpolated values are 0.675 and 0.630 for ¼ and ° respectively.
It is apparent that, relative to Sweden, England features faster early rises for about two
33periods, an interruption for two further periods, and a decided and lasting upward trend
afterwads.
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Figure 15. Survival rates in England (*) and the Swedish benchmark (o).
(15a) ¼, and (15b) °.
Using these English vital statistics in the otherwise benchmark model produces the
outcomes shown in …gure 16. The NRI associated with England stays higher for the …rst
two periods of the transition. Subsequently, the Swedish and English trajectories evolve
very closely. This result is not very surprising given that di¤erences in mortality rates are
most visible during periods 1 and 2. The direction of the e¤ect responds to the model’s
implications of positive e¤ects of higher survival on the NRI. The naked-eye comparison
of the …gures for the English NRI in …gure 14 and those reproduced in …gure 16 show a
rough resemblance for the period 1740-1809. After that, however, the benchmark economy
modi…ed with English mortality indicators fails to predict the persistence of NRI’s above
those observed in Sweden in …gure 14. Thus the complete explanation of the English
demographic transition after 1809 requires to resort to unobservable di¤erences in the
child-cost component and/or rates of technical change.
I begin with the former. The failure to predict the English NRI’s in period 3 and 4
suggests that ´b should be reduced in either or both of these periods. Indeed, reducing
34´b3 and ´b4 from 0.22 and 0.20 to 0.17 and 0.13, respectively, produces a close …t to the
English experience. This choice of ´bt is shown against the benchmark path in …gure 17.
The corresponding path for the NRI is depicted along the benchmark counterpart in …gure
18 below. Note, incidentally, that increasing the child-cost for the English economy tends
to moderate the excessive jump of the NRI in period1 observedin…gure 16, thus improving
the quantitative matching to the observations in …gure 14.
This story is also consistent with the conclusion reached by authors that the initial rises
in reproduction rates in Sweden where mainly driven by mortality reductions rather than
increases in fertility behavior. In England, instead, the population explosion was fueled by
large rises in fertility. This point is made in …gure 19 below that depicts the benchmark
economy’s planned fertility n against the one producedfor the English parameters in…gures
15 and 17.
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Fig 16: NRI BM o, ENG survival rates * 
Figure 16. The NRI implied by English survival rates (*) against the Swedish benchmark (o).
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Figure 17. The child-cost ´b for England (*) against the Swedish benchmark (o).
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Fig 18: NRI BM o, ENG arranged eta1 * 
Figure 18. The NRI implied by English survival rates and child-costs (*) against the Swedish
benchmark (o).
36-2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12
0.9
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
1.8
period
Fig 19: n BM o, ENG arranged eta1 * 
Figure 19. Planned fertility n implied by English survival rates and child-costs (*) against the
Swedish benchmark (o).
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Fig 20: NRI BM o, ENG arranged eta1 and x * 
Figure 20. The NRI implied by English survival rates, child-cost, and productivity growth (*)
against the Swedish benchmark (o).
Finally, a quantitatively better match to the English evidence can be achieved after
some well justi…ed adjustments in the path of technical change. Productivity growth in
37England after period 4 (1870) became slower than in Sweden, whereas it had been faster in
the preceding period. This suggests to …ne-tune the rate of technological change as follows:
raise x1 and x2 from 1.011 and 1.1 to 1.1 and 1.16 respectively; lower x5 and x6 from 2.2
and 2.3 respectively to 2.0. Doing so leads to a NRI for England that is above the Swedish
one throughout, thus producing a close match of the English series in …gure 14. This is
displayed in …gure 20.
To sum up, earlier and faster drops of mortality in England explain part of its initial
more rapid NRI’s relative to Sweden. But this alone cannot account for the persistence
and size of the di¤erences. A complete explanation requires to add that the technology for
children became about 0.17/0.22 or 0.13/0.20 (23% or 35%) cheaper in England than in
Sweden during the period 1810-1879 (periods 3 and 4). In addition, a pattern of technology
growth that is consistent with di¤erences in productivity growth between the two countries
completes the comparative interpretation of the demographic transition in England.
6.2.2 The French Case
It is said that France did not undergo the standard pattern of demographic transition
observed elsewhere. As documented is section 2 and …gure 14, the NRI remained within a
relatively narrow band throughout.
As in the previous section, I will use information on French vital statistics to have a
sense of its importance to explain the particular behavior of the NRI in France. As it
transpires from table 2, the data on survival probabilities for France is incomplete. For
periods 1through 3 I will have tomake an educatedguess. There are clear indications—like
the data represented in …gures 6 and 7 for CDR’s and infant survival rates—that, in the
early periods, France was lagging behind its neighbors. Let us then suppose that France
had a path for survival probabilities ¼ that remained below the benchmark ones between
periods 1 and 3. Tentatively I set ¼1 = 0:6, ¼2 = 0:605 and ¼3 = 0:621 instead of the
benchmark 0.607, 0.0614, and 0.678, respectively. For lack of better information, I set ° as
in the benchmark economy. For periods 4 through 7, table 2 provides information directly.
The rest of parameters are as in the benchmark economy. Figure 21 below depicts the
choice of ¼ and ° for France and, for comparison purposes, the benchmark Swedish case.
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Figure 21. Survival rates in France (*) and the Swedish benchmark (o).
(21a) ¼, and (21b) °.
The implications of the pattern of mortality declines assumed for France is illustrated
in …gure 22. Between periods 1 and 4, the NRI is lower in France. Low survival rates in
France over this period certainly contributed to moderate population growth. However,
although somehow delayed, the pattern under French mortality conditions still shows a
counterfactual surge of population growth in periods 4 and 5. In the light of section 2,
the assumption that technology growth in France is similar to that in Sweden appears a
reasonable one. Therefore, Iwill concentrate nowon …nding the di¤erences in the child-cost
relative to the Swedish benchmark that are required to explain the French experience.
Figure 23 depicts the required path for the child-costs that matches the French ex-
perience under the local mortality conditions. Compared with the benchmark path also
displayed, France must have experienced less abrupt initial reductions and, thereby, a
smoother pro…le. Figure 24 represents the implied path for the NRI which accurately
matches the corresponding French observations represented in …gure 14 above.
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Fig 22: NRI BM o, FR survival rates * 
Figure 22. The NRI implied by French survival rates (*) against the Swedish benchmark (o).
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Figure 23. The child-cost ´b for France (*) against the Swedish benchmark (o).
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Figure 24. The NRI implied by French survival rates and child-costs (*) against the Swedish
benchmark (o).
To sum up, higher mortality contributed to the comparatively lower NRI in France over
periods 1 and 2 (1740-1809). However under the benchmark conditions for the child-cost
component, the model still produces NRI’s that are much too high and shifting relative to
the French experience. The explanation of the smoother evolution of the NRI in France
requires to bring in a path for the child-cost that shows less abrupt changes than the
benchmark one and remains above it throughout.
6.3 Discussion
The exercises in section 6.1 and 6.2 can be regarded as the basis for the interpretation
of the demographic-economic transformations under study. This tentative interpretation
revolves around three elements: mortality, technological change, and child-costs. Whereas
mortality and, to some extent, technological progress can be related to observed variables,
the model’s child-cost component cannot. Therefore, the contribution of the child-cost to
the interpretation of the facts under study is a measure of the importance of unknown
factors.
The …ndings reported here suggest that the importance of those unknown factors may
41be signi…cant. The pattern of rapid drops at the beginning and subsequent rises appears to
have aprimary role in shaping the typical hump-shapedtrajectory for the NRI. Besides, the
late increases appear to account for part of the high rates of productivity growth observed
in the more recent times. Concerning the comparative analysis, di¤erences in those factors
must have accounted for some of the disparities in NRI between Sweden and England
over the period 1810-1879, and for di¤erences between Sweden and France over a much
longer period. There is certainly a role for mortality and technology. The point is that the
explanation provided would miss some prominent features of the data without the presence
of the special patterns for the child-cost parameter found in the analysis, both over time
and across countries.
But since the model’s child-cost component does not have a clear empirical counterpart,
it becomes di¢cult to judge whether the paths for this parameter implied by the analysis
make empirical sense. This is a question that must be confronted if one wants to evaluate
the quantitative relevance of the neoclassical model with dynastic preferences for the study
of the demographic transition. This calls for investigating versions of the model where
the cost of children can be related to meaningful observable factors. A formulation that
reduces the importance of unobservable factors will be a step towards the success of the
neoclassical model with dynastic preferences. If such an endeavor proves elusive (after all,
the current framework might not a be a useful abstraction for the questions at hand) then
perhaps an alternative framework of analysis should be considered. The existing literature
has done some, while partial, progress in those directions. In the rest of this section, I want
to highlight the relation of this literature with the present paper.
An important set of contributions includes Becker et al. (1990), Ehrlich and Lui (1991),
Galor and Weil (1996), Dahan and Tsiddon (1998) and Galor and Weil (2000). These are
works where human capital and distribution considerations are placed at the centre. They
derive the child-cost from primitive assumptions. For example, in Becker, Murphy and
Tamura (1990) and Ehrlich and Lui (1991) it is the cost of time that rises as human capital
accumulates. In Galor and Weil (1996) gender-gap model, technological assumption are
laid out such that women’s wages rise to a larger proportion than households income. In
Dahan and Tsiddon (1998) the fraction of low-fertility skilled people increases over the
transition. However, the ability of these models to quantitatively match the observations
has not been explored yet. On the other hand, these papers show that departures from the
42neoclassical growth model and/or dynastic preferences may have a profound e¤ect for the
predictions of the theory [for example, Ehrlich and Lui (1991)]. Hence they may well have
implications for the cost of children that di¤er for the ones found here both quantitatively
and, perhaps, qualitatively.
On the other hand, the works that build on the neoclassical model happen to share
a quantitative approach. Moe (1998) introduces human capital and non-market activities
in a model similar to the present one. She applies that model to data for a developing
country. Hansen and Prescott (1998) study the English historical demographic transition
and the shift from the pre-industrial regime to the modern mode of production. In their
model, fertility and population follows a pre-speci…ed functional form though.
Fernandez-Villaverde (1999) is closest to the present analysis. That paper studies the
English demographic transition. In a 4-period lifetimes version of the present framework,
the author introduces human capital and skill-biased technological change. Changes in
this form of technical change then induce changes in relative prices that can be associated
with changes in the cost of children. As in the present paper, the demographic transition
requires changes in those relative prices. Unlike the present paper, his quantitative analy-
sis refers to the steady-state, whereas only the qualitative features of the transitions since
the late 19th century are studied. In contrast, in the present paper the focus in on the
quantitative properties of the transition within and across countries since the mid 18th
century. Fernandez-Villaverde (1999) claims some success in explaining the English demo-
graphic transition appealing to growth in skill-biased productivity. Two remarks are in
order. First, the emphasis of that paper is on the late stages of the transition that feature
secular declining fertility and population growth. Then, just as in the present analysis,
technical change discourages fertility. In addition, the skill-biased nature of this change
ampli…es the e¤ect and helps get the net numbers right. Thus perhaps the surge of the
child-cost that I …nd since the late 19th century could just be interpreted as the e¤ect of
the skill-bias. However, this explanation does not carry over to explain the experience of
the preceding period starting in the mid 18th century. I have documented the large rises
in CBR’s in Britain during most of that period. Skill-biased technical progress alone is
inconsistent with those observations and, relative to the present paper, would require even
larger drops in other unknown components of the child-cost.
The second remark concerns the design of the experiments. In Fernandez-Villaverde
43(1999) technical change is considered to occur in isolation, with constant mortality rates
throughout. The present paper shows that the rapid increases in survival probabilities
since the late 19th century create a pressure towards higher fertility. In my model, the
rapid increases in labor-augmenting technical change are not enough to exactly match the
observed declines over the period. It remains to be seen if, in the presence of realistic
changes in mortality, Fernandez-Villaverde (1999) would require to assume an unrealisti-
cally faster rate of skill-biased technical change or, equivalently, a greater role for increases
in the unobservable child-cost component.
Eckstein et al. (1999) focus on explaining the fertility transition in Sweden based on
the long (1751-1990) time-series of mortality and wages in a life-cycle model. They found
that in the estimated model, wages and mortality alone accurately explain the evolution
of total fertility. Aside from the fact that theirs is not an equilibrium model nor does have
capital accumulation choices, the main di¤erence with the present analysis is the absence of
altruism inpreferences. My result that technology change (that drives wages) andmortality
are not enough suggests that the speci…cation of preferences may be a critical aspect. Also
the success of Eckstein et al. (1999) could be partly attributed to the replacement-e¤ect
of infant mortality changes on total fertility. The present paper focuses on the NRI rather
than total fertility and, therefore, the in‡uence of infant mortality changes is modest or nil
(see footnote 2).
I want to …nish this discussion with a few remarks of caution regarding the present
paper. One concern is the accuracy in the measurement of observations and selection
of targets that have been used in the calibration analysis. For some parameters, there
are simply no observations available and their values have had to be approximated using
the best information available to me. Even for the …gures documented in the literature,
considerable dispute remains among historical demographers.
In another respect, the exact matching of the targeted paths for productivity growth
has proved elusive. Thus the results cannot be evaluated in terms of the ability to precisely
match this observation. The compromise adopted here has been to deal with productivity
changes more informally. In particular it has been assumed to be the same in Sweden and
France; for England, it has been shifted somehow arbitrarily in view of the observed pro-
ductivity growth evidence. But this evidence itself has to be approached with reservations.
447 Conclusion and …nal remarks
Inthis paper the neoclassical model of growth with dynastic preferences is analyzed quanti-
tatively to identify the role of di¤erent factors in shaping the demographic transition since
the mid 18th century in a set of representative European countries. The factors considered
are the evolution of mortality, technical change, and the costs of rearing children.
A benchmark is selected such that, given the historical path of mortality rates in Swe-
den, the model matches the low frequency time series for the natural rate of increase and
productivity growth in that country. It emerges that the cost of children must have …rst
decreased between 1740 and 1914 to, subsequently, rise towards current values. To explain
the relatively larger burst of population growth inEngland until about 1879, the amplitude
of the fall inthe child-cost component must have been larger there between 1810-1879. The
relatively mild shifts of the NRI observed in France suggest that the child-cost must have
remained relatively high and stable there throughout the period. The model also identi…es
a role for the observed di¤erences in mortality changes inexplaining part of the faster initial
population boom in England during 1740-1809 and the more moderate pattern in France.
Di¤erences in mortality rates appear to have tiny e¤ects on productivity growth though.
This paper demonstrates that an understanding of the determinants of the cost of
children may be an important ingredient in the explanation of the fertility transition and
the di¤erent patterns observed across countries. The explanatory power of the model relies
largely on the existence of child-costs di¤erences —both across countries and over time—
in precisely the direction and order of magnitude found in the analysis. By assumption,
though, this paper does not provide an explanation of the factors that drive the behavior of
thechild-cost parameter and, therefore, cannot assess whetherthe quantitative implications
…nd empirical support. This paper, however, may be auseful guide in the searchfortheories
that endogeneize the cost of children. It will be down to those theories to relate their
fundamental parameters to observations and test their explanatory power.
This paper builds on a stylized model and is thus bound to have limitations. In order to
focus on the e¤ects of mortality and allow for the computation of the transition, a particu-
larly simple form for the child-rearing technology has been assumed. Another assumption
is the existence of markets providing full life-insurance. While simplifying the treatment
of uncertainty, this view minimizes the economic impact of mortality rates by ruling out
45the direct e¤ect of survival on the expected returns to investment. The demographic struc-
ture of this paper is very simple. A natural extension of this work is to consider a richer
more realistic setup. Finally, the analysis has considered the framework of the neoclassical
exogenous-growth model with dynastic preferences. The literature shows that alternative
speci…cations oftechnology and/or preferences may provide useful insights. Future research
should pursue these leads with the systematic quantitative approach adopted in this paper.
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48A Data Appendix
² Figure 1: CBR and CDR for England. Period 1541-1849 from Wrigley and Scho…eld (1981,TabA3.3).
Period 1850-1984 from o¢cial registrations as reported in Chesnais (1992).
² Figure 2: CBR and CDR for Sweden 1740-1984. O¢cial registrations in Chesnais (1992,TabA1.1-
A1.7).
² Figure3: CBR and CDRfor England 1740-1984. Period 1740-1849, Wrigley and Scho…eld (1981,TabA3.3).
Period 1850-1984, o¢cial registrations in Chesnais (1992,TabA1.3-A1.7).
² Figure 4: CBR and CDR for France 1740-1984. O¢cial registrations in Chesnais (1992,TabA1.1-
A1.7).
² Figure 5: NRI calculated from sources as in …gures 2,3 and 4.
² Table 1: 35-year annual averages 1740-1984 for NRI. Sources as for …gures 5.
² Table 2: from variable lx (number of surviving to exact age x out of 100,000 born) for x = 1;15;40
in Key…t and Flieger (1968) for Sweden, England and France, survival probabilities can then be
calculated ¼(0 ¡ 1), ¼(0 ¡ 15) and ¼(0¡ 40). From there,
¼(1 ¡ 40) =
¼(0 ¡ 40)
¼(0 ¡ 1)
:
Similarly,
° ´
1 ¡ ¼(15¡ 40)
1 ¡ ¼(1¡ 40)
=
µ
1 ¡
¼(0 ¡ 40)
¼(0 ¡ 15)
¶
1
1 ¡ ¼(1¡ 40)
:
The …gures are averaged over the periods represented and across sexes.
For England, this source only provides data from 1861 on. To reconstruct early data, the periods
1740-1779 and 1780-1809 are based on Wrigley et al (1997, Table6.1,p215 and Tab6.19,p290)’s …gures
for nqx, which is the probability of dying for an individual of exact age x, before reaching age x+ n.
These provide 1q0, 4q1, 5q5, 5q10, 5q25, 5q30, and 5q35, for 1740-9, 1750-9, 1760-9, 1770-9, 1780-9,
1790-9, 1800-9 (child rates go a little farther). But …gures for mortality rates between ages 15 and
25 (10q15) are missing. Thus 5q15 and 5q20 will be calculated as a proportion of 1q0, the proportion
being the average factor of proportion observed in periods 1861, 1871, and 1881 in Key…t and Flieger
(1968) life-tables: 5q15=1q0 = 0:191497919 and 5q20=1q0 = 0:24447499.
² Figure 6: CDR Sweden, England and France 1740-1984. Source as for …gures 2, 3 and 4.
² Figure 7: Infant survival England 1580-1837 Wrigley et al (1997), and 1861-1965, Key…t and Flieger
(1968). Infant survival Sweden 1861-1965, Key…t and Flieger (1868). Infant survival France, Key…t
and Flieger (1868)
² Table 3: from productivity …gures from Maddison (1991, Tab C11-C12, p274-76). Also Tables 3.1
and 3.3. For England, …gures adjusted for 3 …rst periods as in Hansen and Prescott (1998).
B Optimal choices
Optimal investment, annuities and uncertain life-times
It is expositionally convenient to introduce at this stage some equilibrium properties of prices in assets
markets. This permits to characterize further the solution to the household’s problem as well as to simplify
the de…nition of equilibrium below.
There is individual life-time uncertainty but there is no aggregate risk. At the end of t¡1, a proportion
¼t¡1 of members of generation t ¡ 1 survive, the proportion °(1 ¡ ¼t¡1) dies and leaves children whereas
the fraction (1¡°)(1¡¼ t¡1) dies and leaves no child at all. Hence there is room for operative competitive
annuities markets. Assume that there are insurance …rms o¤ering these assets. Free entry drives pro…ts of
operating …rms to zero. It turns out that these …rms o¤er actuarially fair contracts. At t, the revenues of
the …rms issuing simple annuities are RtNt¡1at and the outlays are ¼t¡1Nt¡1Ra
t at, where Rt is the rate of
49return on equity. Book balancing implies then that Rt = ¼t¡1Ra
t. Likewise, zero pro…ts for …rms trading
in conditional annuities implies that [¼t¡1 + (1¡ ¼t¡1)°]Rs
t = Rt. Consequently,
Ra
t
Rs
t
=
¼t¡1 + (1 ¡ ¼t¡1)°
¼t¡1
:
We now show that the existence of such market provides an insurance mechanism which greatly sim-
pli…es the treatment of uncertainty. An interior solution to the household’s investment problem implies
two FOC’s:
k
V
t+1 : ntu0(ct) = ¯n
1¡²
t Ra
t+1¼tu0(cV
t+1)
k
A
t+1 : nt
³
Ra
t
Rs
t ¡ 1
´
¼t¡1u0(ct) = ¯n
1¡²
t (1¡ ¼t¡1)°Ra
t+1¼tu0(cA
t+1);
where use has been made of the Envelope Theorem. With fair returns on annuities cV
t+1 = cA
t+1 = ct+1 and
kV
t+1 = kA
t+1 = kt+1, where the second statement follows from a standard monotonicity argument. This
leads to Eq.(12) in the text.
Fertility
Optimal choice on nt implies the condition,
(At´t + kt+1)u0(ct) = ¯(1¡ ²)n¡1
t n1¡²
t Vt(kt+1):
The planned number of descendants is chosen so as to balance the cost of an additional descendant in
terms of parent’s utility (LHS) and the marginal utility (RHS).
Use the intergenerational optimality condition above to substitute u0(ct) in order to express the LHS
of the FOC for fertility in terms of generation-t utility,
(´t + kt+1)Rt+1u0(ct+1) = (1¡ ²)Vt(kt+1):
Now replace the term kt+1Rt+1 through the budget constraint and expand the RHS,
[Rt+1´t¼t(ct+1 ¡ wt+1)]u0(ct+1) +
[nt+1(¼t + (1 ¡ ¼t)°)(´t+1 + kt+2)]u0(ct+1) =
(1 ¡ ²)
£
¼ tu(ct+1) + ¯n
1¡²
t+1(¼t + (1 ¡ ¼t)°)Vt+1
¤
:
Use again the FOC for fertility one period ahead to write,
[Rt+1´t + ¼t(ct+1 ¡ wt+1)]u0(ct+1) +
(¼t + (1 ¡ ¼t)°)¯(1 ¡ ²)(nt+1)1¡²Vt+1 =
(1¡ ²)¼tu(ct+1) +
(1 ¡ ²)¯n
1¡²
t+1(¼t + (1 ¡ ¼t)°)Vt+1;
the last terms in both sides cancel so that,
[Rt+1At´t + ¼t(ct+1 ¡ wt+1)]u0(ct+1) = (1 ¡ ²)¼tu(ct+1):
The LHS of this equation represents the marginal cost of nt in terms of utility of adults at t + 1.
The …rst term is the direct outlay on the additional child conveniently capitalized at the interest rate.
The second component is the reduction in net consumption ct+1 ¡ wt+1 due to the lower share of each
descendant on the bequests adjusted by the probability that the additional child survives. The RHS is the
marginal dynastic utility of nt which consists of the gain in adulthood utility at t + 1. The terms in both
sides capturing e¤ects relative to cohorts older than the t+ 1th cancel out. Using the speci…cation of u(:),
it can be rearranged to yield Eq.(10) in the text.
C Bounded utility value
Lemma B1. At the steady-state it must necessarily hold that g(1 + x) < 1¡ ± + r:
50Proof: In a steady-state, dynastic utility can be written in extended form as,
V = ¼c1¡¾
1 X
t=0
h
¯n(1¡²)(¼ + °(1 ¡ ¼))(1 + x)1¡¾
it
:
This sum converges if ¯n1¡²(¼ + °(1 ¡ ¼))(1+ x)1¡¾ < 1. This can be rewritten as,
¯g
µ
¼ + °(1 ¡ ¼)
g
¶²
(1 + x)1¡¾ = ¯g
³
(¯(1¡ ± + r))¡1=²(1 + x)(¡¾)=²
´1=²
(1+ x)1¡¾ < 1;
where I use of eq (4) and eq (21) in the text. Rearrangement concludes. Q.E.D.
D Computation of the Transition
This appendix brie‡y outlines the procedure to compute the transitions when the pre-transitional steady-
state is disturbed by changes at time T. In the paper’s timing, T = 1. I will assume the economy is initially
on a steady-state with constant ¼ i, xi, ´bi and °i, and ^ ki and ^ ci. I consider that at time T the path
for these parameters changes and these changes are known as of T. Note that the new values of xT , °T
and ¼T are known at time T before they are realized at time T + 1. There is perfect foresight about the
future course of events. The only aspect that has to be worked out is how the economy is set on a new
saddle-path after the initial changes. It is instructive to summarize the equilibrium given by Eq.(15)-(17)
as a 2nd order di¤erence equation ¤(:::j:::) = 0. For example, at time t, and under perfect foresight, ^ kt+1
is determined by
¤(^ kt¡1;^ kt;^ kt+1j¼t¡1;°t¡1;xt¡1;´ t;´t¡1;¼t;xt) = 0: (D1)
and consumption
^ ct+1 = ^ c(^ kt;^ ke
t+1j¼t;xt;´t) (D2)
With this, the procedure is as follows:
1. At time t = T ¡ 1, ^ kT ¡1 = ^ ki, ^ cT ¡1 = ^ ci. Then, by (D1) and (D2), ^ kT = ^ ki and ^ cT = ^ ci.
2. At time t = T, again by by (D1) and (D2), ^ kT +1 6= ^ ki and determined by
¤(^ kT ¡1; ^ kT; ^ kT +1j¼T ¡1;°T ¡1;xT¡1;´T;´T ¡1;¼T;xT) = 0:
Correspondingly
^ cT +1 = ^ c(^ kT;^ kT +1j¼T ;xT ;´T) 6= ^ ci:
3. At time t = T + 1, since the initial ^ kT +1 6= ^ ki, the value ^ kT +2 must be the one that places the
economy on its new stable saddle path. The next step shows how this is done.
Consumption ^ ct+2 is then determined by (D2).
4. Choose a ^ kT +2. At time t = T + 2, …nd ^ kT+3 through (D1) by solving
¤(^ kT+1;^ kT +2;^ kT +3j¼T+1;°T +1;xT +1;´T +2;´T +1;¼T+2;xT +2) = 0:
Iterate from t = T + 3 on using
¤(^ kt¡1;^ kt;^ kt+1j¼t¡1;°t¡1;xt¡1;´t;´t¡1;¼t;xt) = 0:
If the path ^ kt converges to the steady-state, then this is the equilibrium. Otherwise, a new value for
^ kT +2 must be selected and the iterations repeated.
The procedure to implement step 4 consists of specifying a large time horizon so that the economy must
have reached the steady-state by then. The chosen path is the one that gets ^ k close to the steady-state
value within an accuracy criterion. To speed up computations, 20 periods were selected …rst. The paths
reported in the paper are not sensitive to increases in the number of periods.
The solution for ^ kt+1 in each period through the non-linear mapping ¤(:::j:::) has used aNewton-Rapson
algorithm. The choice of the initial values that lead to the solution proved to be an issue.
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